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CONTRACT RIGHTS UNDER THE I-864
AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT:
SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING
BINDS COURTS’ HANDS IN A
SHIFTING LANDSCAPE FOR PUBLIC
CHARGE DOCTRINE
JOHN T. BURGER†
INTRODUCTION
Annually, more than half a million sponsors enter into a
contract with the United States Government.1 The consideration
to the sponsor is almost entirely speculative and unknown. The
sponsor’s obligations are indefinite and may be subject to change
by the Government after signing. The sponsors routinely sign
these agreements without proper counsel, or with interested
counsel. Federal agencies are currently designing procedures to
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1
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANN. FLOW REP.: LAWFUL PERMANENT
RESIDENTS 5 (Aug. 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Lawful_Permanent_Residents_2017.pdf. “[M]ore than half a million sponsors” is an
estimate based on the number of Family-Based Lawful Permanent Resident
applications approved by the U.S. Government between 2015 and 2017. To be
approved, most of these applications require a properly executed Affidavit of
Support, discussed at infra Part I. It is difficult to know precisely how many
Affidavits of Support are executed on an annual basis. More than one sponsor can
sign for a single immigrant, while multiple immigrants can be sponsored by the
same immigrant. For this reason, “more than half a million” is an estimate based on
a one-to-one, sponsor-to-immigrant ratio, where the number of approved
applications has ranged from 678,978 to 804,793 between 2015 and 2017. Id.
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enforce these agreements against sponsors, possibly on a massive
scale.2 And, if recent case law holds firm, these sponsors will be
absolutely defenseless to such claims in a court of law.
The I-864, or Affidavit of Support (“Affidavit”), is a
statutorily created contract between the United States
Government and a sponsor to an immigrant.3 The sponsor agrees
to provide support to the sponsored immigrant where it is
necessary to prevent that immigrant from becoming a public
charge.4 In the I-864, the sponsor agrees that the immigrant will
remain at above 125% of the poverty line; if the immigrant falls
below the poverty line, the sponsor will be required to issue
support payments to make up the difference.5 Furthermore, if
the immigrant receives public benefits that are included in the
public charge guidelines, the agency issuing the benefit may hold
the sponsor liable and recoup those benefits under the I-864.6
The sponsor’s obligations to the immigrant are indefinite and do
not sever upon divorce.7
This Affidavit, including the required obligations, is a
mandatory part of public charge determinations.8 To ensure that
an immigrant is admissible, most family-based immigrants must
show,9 through a totality of the circumstances, that they are not
“likely at any time to become a public charge.”10 If they fail to do
so, they will be deemed inadmissible and will be unable to enter
the United States.11 While the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) has historically defined a “public
charge” as “an individual who is likely to become primarily

2
See Memorandum on Enforcing the Legal Responsibilities of Sponsors of
Aliens, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201900334 (May 23, 2019) [hereinafter May
23 Memo].
3
Greg McLawsen, The I-864 Affidavit of Support: An Intro to the Immigration
Form You Must Learn To Love/Hate, 48 FAM. L.Q. 581, 583 (2015).
4
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1) (2012).
5
McLawsen, supra note 3, at 583.
6
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(1)(A).
7
Affidavit of Support Under Section 213A of the INA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/i-864 [hereinafter “I-864”].
8
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4)(C)–(D) (West 2014).
9
Wherever a U.S. citizen or permanent resident files an immigration petition
for a foreign family member, an I-864 form will be required. McLawsen, supra
note 3, at 583.
10
8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4)(A).
11
8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a).
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dependent on the government for subsistence,”12 the Attorney
General and consular officers retain considerable discretion in
their determination, using a set of statutorily defined factors.13
While factors like the immigrant’s age, health, family status,
financial health, and education are all part of the public charge
determination, the Attorney General may also consider the
Affidavit.14 In practice, the I-864 has been treated as an
enforceable contract, which has meant that “a valid Form I-864 is
virtually always sufficient to avoid inadmissibility on public
charge grounds,” except in cases relating to extreme medical
conditions.15 This setup has created a contractual scheme where,
in consideration for undertaking the enforceable support
obligations under the Affidavit,16 the Government virtually
guarantees that the immigrant will not be deemed inadmissible
as a public charge.17
For a commonly executed contract that has been enforceable
in court for nearly twenty years, case law has been sparse.18
Specifically, it remains unclear whether common-law defenses
like fraud, duress, “unclean hands,” and unconscionability apply
to the Affidavit in most jurisdictions.19 While still an open
question in many jurisdictions, the greatest volume of case law
for common-law contract defenses in the Affidavit has addressed

12
Public Charge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (June 26, 2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/public-charge. A recently enacted rule, however,
changes the previous definition of “public charge” as “primarily dependent on the
government,” and instead emphasizes the immigrant’s receipt of “means-tested
public benefits.” Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292,
41304, 41355–56 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214,
245, & 248). The government justifies the change “as a policy matter” to remedy an
“unduly restrictive” obstacle to making public charge determinations. Id. at 41356.
13
8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(4)(B).
14
Id.
15
Greg McLawsen, USCIS Proposes New Public Charge Rules: The Form I-864
will Become Table Stakes as Scrutiny Shifts to the Applicant, 23–21 BENDER’S
IMMIGR. BULL. 01 (2018).
16
See Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *6, (N.D. Ind.
May 27, 2005). Additionally, the obligation may be enforced in “any appropriate
court,” which has been determined to refer to both federal and state courts.
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e) (2012).
17
See McLawsen, supra note 15.
18
Stephanie L. Tang, Arguing Affidavits of Support, 105 ILL. B. J. 34, 36 (2017).
19
John Patrick Pratt & Ira J. Kurzban, The Affidavit of Support Creates a
Legally Enforceable Contract by the Sponsored Foreign National: Efforts To Collect
Damages as Support Obligations Against Divorced Spouses, 57 FED. LAW. 44, 45
(2010).
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a mitigation of damages defense.20 In the prototypical fact
pattern, an immigrant, treated as third-party beneficiary to the
Affidavit, seeks to enforce her rights against the sponsor, who
pleads an affirmative mitigation duty in the hopes it will reduce
his liability to the immigrant.21 One such case, Liu v. Mund,
analyzes not only the issue of whether a mitigation of damages
defense should apply to the Affidavit, but also larger issues
pertaining to the fundamental character and purposes of the
form.22
Courts are currently split on the issue of whether a
mitigation of damages defense is available to sponsors to the
Affidavit.23 Leading cases, including Liu, rely upon the unique
nature of the form to assert that such defenses are precluded.24
This Note will argue that the I-864 should be treated under the
same principles as a typical common-law contract. Part I of this
Note will trace the history of the I-864 form, primarily focusing
on the legislation and case law rendering the form an enforceable
contract. Part II will discuss Liu v. Mund, focusing extensively
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s
legal and policy arguments, and how other courts have responded
in its wake.
Subsequently, Part III will respond to the
arguments in Liu, offering novel arguments. Finally, Part III
will offer analysis of the Affidavit in light of recently proposed
executive action, making this Note the first to tie these executive
actions directly to parties’ contract rights.25 Ultimately, this

20
According to the Restatement of Contracts, “damages are not recoverable for
loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or
humiliation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (AM. LAW. INST.
1981). The rule hedges against waste by encouraging an injured party to make
“reasonable efforts” to offset the injury resulting from a breach of contract. Id. The
defense is pleaded affirmatively and does not create liability for the party, but
merely offsets the damages to which the party may have been entitled under a
breach of contract claim. Id.
21
See, e.g., Tornheim v. Kohn, No. 00 CV 5084(SJ), 2002 WL 482534, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); see also Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1175–76 (9th Cir.
2016); Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1131 (W.D. Wash. 2017); Dorsaneo v.
Dorsaneo, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Stump, 2005 WL 1290658, at
*1; Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d 808, 810–11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); In re Marriage of
Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 864 (Ct. App. 2017).
22
686 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012).
23
Tang, supra note 18, at 37.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See generally Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114
(proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, &
248).
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Note argues that treating the I-864 form as a common-law
contract is not only a proper reading of the authorizing statutes,
but also that diverging from Liu will give courts flexibility to
ensure just outcomes in litigation.
I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT
IN PUBLIC CHARGE INADMISSIBILITY: FROM THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNTIL 2012

While the enforceable Affidavit of Support is a somewhat
recent invention, the exclusion of immigrants based on their
purported likelihood of becoming a public charge is not.26 Indeed,
the general Immigration Act of 1882, one of the first major
Congressional immigration statutes, excluded from entry “idiots,
lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to become a public
charge.”27 This ground for inadmissibility was reinforced in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) enacted in 1950.28 An
immigrant could increase her odds of admission, however, by
having a sponsor execute an I-134, an “affidavit of support,” that
stated that the sponsor is “willing and able” to provide financial
support to the sponsored immigrant to keep her from becoming a
public charge.29 Subsequent case law, however, held that the
I-134 was not intended to be a judicially enforceable contract, but
merely a moral pledge amounting to one of several factors
factoring into consular officials’ determination of whether the
immigrant was likely to become a public charge.30
The status of the “affidavit of support” requirement changed
with the enactment of two statutes: The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”),
enacted on August 22, 1996,31 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),

26
Early American Immigration Policies, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.
(Sep. 4, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/agencyhistory/early-american-immigration-policies.
27
Id.
28
See Rómulo E. Guevara & Frederick F. Calope, Origin and Evolution: Ten
Years of the Affidavit of Support Under IIRIRA, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2849,
2850 (Dec. 10, 2007).
29
Id.
30
San Diego Cty. v. Viloria, 276 Cal. App. 2d 350, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
31
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 [hereinafter PRWORA].
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enacted on September 30 of that same year.32 PRWORA, an
omnibus welfare reform bill, modified the INA to create a legally
enforceable “contract” between the Government and the sponsor
of an immigrant beneficiary.33 IIRIRA retained the “contract”
language while specifying the terms of this arrangement.34
The Affidavit, after some initial ambiguity,35 went into full
effect in 1999, per the guidelines of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s Field Guidance for public charge
inadmissibility.36 Per PRWORA and IIRIRA, this new Affidavit,
eventually the I-864, was mandatory in the public charge
determination process and enforceable against the sponsor by the
sponsored immigrant; federal, state, and local governments; and
agencies providing means-tested benefits.37
The obligations created under this form are “mighty.”38 For
example, the sponsor must “maintain the sponsored alien at an
annual income that is not less than 125% of the Federal poverty
line during the period in which the affidavit is enforceable.”39 As
of 2015, this mandatory support amounts to approximately
$15,000 annually for a single-person household, plus
approximately $5,000 per month for each additional household
member.40
Furthermore, these obligations are indefinite,
terminating only when the sponsored immigrant (1) becomes a

32
See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) [hereinafter IIRIRA] (the provisions of IIRIRA were a
rider on this omnibus appropriations bill).
33
PRWORA, supra note 31. In pertinent part: “No affidavit of support may be
accepted by the Attorney General or by any consular officer to establish that an alien
is not excludable as a public charge under Section 212(a)(4) unless such affidavit is
executed as a contract.” Id. sec. 213A(a) (emphasis added).
34
See IIRIRA, supra note 32, sec. 213A. Here, among other provisions, the
support obligation was tied to 125% of the federal poverty line.
35
Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852. Because the new affidavit did not
go into effect as mandatory until the official release of implementing regulations, it
did not immediately supplant the I-134.
36
Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge
Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (proposed May 26, 1999).
37
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(B) (2012). The first known case upholding the form’s
enforceability was Tornheim v. Kohn, where the court distinguished between the
unenforceable I-134 form and the enforceable I-864. Tornheim v. Kohn, No. 00 CV
5084(SJ), 2002 WL 482534, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
38
McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586.
39
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A). The contract also provides that the sponsor is
required to notify USCIS of any change in address within 30 days of the change.
I-864, supra note 7, at 7.
40
See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593
(Jan 22, 2014).
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United States citizen, (2) completes forty quarters of work,
(3) loses lawful permanent resident status and leaves the United
States, (4) receives a new grant for adjustment of status with a
new affidavit of support, or (5) dies.41 Furthermore, the Affidavit
may be used by governments or other benefit-distributing
agencies to recoup an immigrant’s ill-gotten benefits from
sponsors.42 As an added note, the I-864 expressly provides that a
divorce does not sever a sponsor’s obligations to the sponsored
immigrant.43
Case law under the I-864 has been relatively sparse.44 While
governments and agencies retain the right to sue under the form,
they have largely declined to do so because of a perception that
the collection process is administratively burdensome and
politically charged.45 For that reason, most of the cases seeking
enforcement of the Affidavit have involved an immigrant seeking
to enforce the support obligations, most particularly in the
context of family law.46
After the passage of PRWORA and IIRIRA, courts quickly
identified the I-864 Affidavit of Support as an enforceable
contract, standing in contrast to its predecessor.47 In Tornheim v.
Kohn, the plaintiff sought to enforce sponsor obligations against
the defendant, his father-in-law, using the statutory language
created by PRWORA, IIRIRA, and the previously signed I-134
affidavit of support.48 There, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York held that the I-134 was not an
enforceable contract, but a “morally binding agreement,” holding,
by implication, that the newer I-864 was the enforceable
“contract” proscribed originally by PRWORA.49 Litigation about

41

I-864, supra note 7, at 7; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(2)–(3).
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e)(2).
43
I-864, supra note 7, at 7 (“NOTE: Divorce does not terminate your
obligations under Form I-864.” (emphasis in original)).
44
Tang, supra note 18, at 36.
45
Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852.
46
See Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Immigration Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) and
Efforts To Collect Damages as Support Obligations Against Divorced Spouses – What
Practitioners Need To Know, 83 FLA. B.J. 53, 53 (2009).
47
Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852.
48
Tornheim v. Kohn, No. 00 CV 5084(SJ), 2002 WL 482534, at *1 (Mar.
26, 2002).
49
Id. at *3.
42
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parties’ rights has been sparse, but these rights were largely
defined ten years later when the Seventh Circuit explored the
issue in Liu v. Mund.50
II. LIU V. MUND: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT TAKES A FIRM POSITION
ON PARTIES’ CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE I-864
A.

Liu v. Mund: History and Procedural Posture

Liu v. Mund, written by Circuit Court Judge Richard Posner,
forged the landscape for interpreting the Affidavit of Support and
remains the leading case on the topic of mitigation of damages.51
The case centered on a failed marriage between Timothy Mund,
an American from Wisconsin, and Wenfang Liu, a Chinese
woman that he met and married while living in China.52 The
couple executed an I-864 when they returned to the United
States after two years of marriage, with Mund as the sponsor
and Liu as the sponsored immigrant.53 After years of a difficult
and allegedly abusive marriage, the couple divorced.54 When
adjudicating the divorce, the Wisconsin divorce court declined to
address the bearing of federal law, including the obligations
under the I-864.55
Liu then filed an independent suit in the Western District of
Wisconsin seeking to enforce Mund’s obligations under the I-864
Affidavit of Support.56 With respect to the issue of whether Liu
was obligated to mitigate her damages, the court noted that
Mund failed to properly plead the issue as an affirmative
defense, and thus the issue was precluded.57 Despite this, the
court noted that “the notion that an immigrant has a duty to
mitigate damages not only seems fair, but is consistent with the
notion of the plaintiff’s status as a third-party beneficiary to a

50

Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir.
2012); see also McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586.
51
McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586.
52
Liu, 686 F.3d at 419.
53
Id.
54
Id.; see Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, Wenfang Liu at 5, Liu v. Mund,
686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1453).
55
Id. As part of the divorce agreement, Mund was obligated to support Liu at
$500 per month, on the condition that Liu seek work by making at least four job
applications per month. Id.
56
Id. at 420.
57
Liu v. Mund, 748 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2010), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012).
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contract.”58 The court then calculated the plaintiff’s damages,
noting that Liu’s recovery of support obligations should be tied to
her “reasonable efforts to seek work” during that time period.59
Liu appealed this issue to the Seventh Circuit, where the
court inquired broadly “whether in a suit to enforce the
obligation of support created by the federal affidavit the plaintiff
has a legal duty to mitigate damages.”60 That decision has since
become an inflection point in the interpretation of the Affidavit
and its requirements,61 and its reasoning is, therefore, worthy of
close analysis.
B. Liu v. Mund: Circuit Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit
Rule Against the Application of a Mitigation of Damages
Defense
The Seventh Circuit eventually held that a mitigation
defense would be unavailable to the sponsor of an Affidavit.62
First, the court quickly rejected the premise that common law
principles should govern the contract.63 Taking a dismissive
tone, the court drew on its understanding of the history of the
common law and its role in statutory interpretation:
But the hoary maxim that statutory repeals of common law
rules are disfavored is a poor guide to legislative meaning, for it
is the fossil remnant of the traditional hostility of English
judges to legislation. Those judges had made up the common
law, which for an age was virtually the entire law of England,
and they resented legislative interlopers. One would hardly
expect legislators to respond by being careful not to step into the
common law flower bed.64

Despite this approach, the court acknowledged that common law
may play a role to provide “details that the legislators didn’t
bother to specify.”65 For example, the court drew on the common
law to hold that Liu, a third-party beneficiary to the Affidavit,
would typically have the same duties and rights as a signatory to
the contract.66
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 963–64.
Id. at 965.
Liu, 686 F.3d at 420.
See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586.
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422.
Id. at 421.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
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The court then posed the central question “whether reading
a duty of mitigation into the immigration statute and the
regulations and the affidavit-contract would serve or disserve
statutory and regulatory objectives.”67 In other words, the
Seventh Circuit framed the defense as an interposition,
submitting it to the threshold test of whether it was consistent
with the purposes of PRWORA and IIRIRA, rather than
assuming that mitigation, as well as other common-law defenses,
would be applied as a default or gap-filling rule to the Affidavit
as part of the “contract” first articulated in PRWORA.68
Gauging the statutory purpose behind the Affidavit, the
court made its central distinction:
The Justice Department argues as we noted that to impose a
duty to mitigate would encourage immigrants to become selfsufficient. But self-sufficiency, though mentioned briefly in the
House Conference Report on the 1996 statute as a goal, see H.R.
Rep. No. 104–828, p. 241 (1996), is not the goal stated in the
statute; the stated statutory goal, remember, is to prevent the
admission to the United States of any alien who “is likely at any
time to become a public charge.”69

In the Seventh Circuit’s construction, then, the primary statutory
purpose animating the Affidavit of Support requirement is not to
ensure that immigrants who do come to the country are
self-sufficient, but rather to prevent the entry of at-risk
immigrants altogether by imposing a heavy burden on sponsors.70
This distinction forms the core of Liu’s reasoning, as it formed
the basis for the court to eschew the application of common-law
principles.71 Further, it has largely been cited and relied upon
directly by subsequent courts.72
This distinction, however, requires some clarification. First,
the Seventh Circuit’s observations about “the 1996 statute” refer
exclusively to IIRIRA, as is made clear by Judge Posner’s
reference to IIRIRA’s House Report.73 As detailed earlier, the
67

Id.
Compare id. with infra notes 116–122 and accompanying text (illustrating a
common assumption among lower courts that common-law contract defenses would
apply as a default rule where the statute’s meaning was unclear).
69
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422 (emphasis added).
70
Id. (“The absence of such a duty . . . tends to make prospective sponsors more
cautious about sponsoring immigrants.”).
71
Id. at 421.
72
See infra Part II.C.
73
See Liu, 686 F.3d at 420. In detailing the statutory history, the Circuit Court
observes that sponsors’ affidavits “generally had not been understood to impose a
68
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statute that made the Affidavit an enforceable contract was not
IIRIRA, but the bill that preceded it: the omnibus welfare bill,
PRWORA.74 Indeed, only the precise terms of the contract were
elaborated in IIRIRA, not the fact of its enforceability.75 Despite
this, neither PRWORA, nor its role in creating an enforceable
Affidavit, were mentioned in the opinion.76 This observation is
significant in light of the opinion’s distinction, as
“self-sufficiency,” a concept dismissed in Judge Posner’s opinion,
is indeed an express and fundamental purpose in the PRWORA
scheme on welfare and immigration.77
legal duty on the sponsor to support the sponsored person.” Id. The opinion then
discusses that the Affidavit would eventually become enforceable but does not
directly state which statute allowed that shift to come to pass. Id.
74
See PRWORA, supra note 31, sec. 213A(a). Remember that the PRWORA,
enacted on August 22, 1996, predated IIRIRA, which was enacted on September
30, 1996.
75
See supra Part I.
76
See id.
77
See PRWORA, supra note 31, sec. 400. The complete purpose statements for
PRWORA’s approach to immigration and welfare are as follows:
SEC. 400. STATEMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY CONCERNING
WELFARE AND IMMIGRATION.
The Congress makes the following statements concerning national policy
with respect to welfare and immigration:
(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration
law since this country's earliest immigration statutes.
(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that—
(A) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public resources to
meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and the
resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations, and
(B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for
immigration to the United States.
(3) Despite the principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been applying for
and receiving public benefits from Federal, State, and local governments at
increasing rates.
(4) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and unenforceable
financial support agreements have proved wholly incapable of assuring
that individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.
(5) It is a compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility
and sponsorship agreements in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in
accordance with national immigration policy.
(6) It is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.
(7) With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning
the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this title, a State that
chooses to follow the Federal classification in determining the eligibility of
such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the
least restrictive means available for achieving the compelling governmental
interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national
immigration policy.
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After setting forth its understanding of statutory purpose,
the Seventh Circuit analyzed the potential policy implications
and how the absence of a mitigation doctrine may affect the
parties to the case.78 Indeed, Judge Posner confidently suggested
that imposing an unconditional, indefinite support obligation
may have affected Mr. Mund’s willingness to sponsor his wife in
the first place.79 Judge Posner then examined Liu’s earning
potential and compared it to the “meager” support obligation,
concluding that Liu still had a “strong incentive” to seek
employment.80
Concluding, Judge Posner raised an array of arguments
pertaining to judicial interests. First, he cited the “increased
complication” that allowing a mitigation defense would create
when attempting to enforce the obligation.81 Then, Judge Posner
questioned whether federal courts are a proper forum for such a
dispute, seemingly eager to wash his and the court’s hands of
“domestic-relations disputes.”82
While these issues are
prominent in Judge Posner’s opinion, the legal distinction drawn
from the supposed purpose of IIRIRA has formed the basis for
subsequent courts’ rejections of the mitigation doctrine.83

Id. (emphases added).
78
See Liu, 686 F.3d at 422.
79
Id. (“Had [Mund] known that by bringing [Liu] to the United States he would
be assuming a virtually unconditional obligation to support her indefinitely even if
they later divorced, he might not have signed the affidavit, and the couple might
have remained in China—and perhaps divorced there, ending her right to become a
permanent resident of the United States.”).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 422–23.
82
Id. at 423. This reluctance to enter into domestic relations law also seems
motivated by a perception that this issue is too minor for the federal courts:
The duty is federal and so would presumably be defined by federal common
law. We are not pointed to any federal common law duty of mandatory job
search, so the federal courts would have to create one for I–864 cases
(should the courts ever see another one—which would be likely if we upheld
the district court). It hardly seems worth the effort.
Id. (emphasis added).
83
See infra Part II.C.
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C. Liu v. Mund: Other Jurisdictions Reinforce the Seventh
Circuit’s Decision and Reasoning
In the wake of Liu, most courts have relied upon the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning to preclude a mitigation of damages defense,
with few exceptions.84 In Liu v. Kell, the District Court for the
Western District of Washington not only relied on its reading of
the statutory purpose to preclude a mitigation defense, but also
shared the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to apply common law
principles to the I-864 writ large.85 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals took a similarly deferential stance in Zhu v. Deng,
following the Seventh Circuit not only in its interpretation of
IIRIRA and the Affidavit of Support requirement, but also in its
reading of how and whether the common law should be applied.86
In In re Marriage of Kumar, a California Court of Appeal
deferred entirely to the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning on the issue
of mitigation, quoting the opinion extensively and denying the
defense on the basis that “[w]e find Liu persuasive.”87
Other subsequent cases have used Liu’s reasoning outside of
the particular issue of mitigation. In Erler v. Erler, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue
of “household size” in the Affidavit, examining how that would
affect the support required from an ex-spouse sponsor.88 In doing
so, it drew on the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of the
Affidavit’s statutory purpose when discussing whether the
sponsor or immigrant may receive “windfall benefits,” and
ultimately decided that sponsors should bear the greater
financial risk.89 In Dorsaneo v. Dorsaneo, the District Court for
84
See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586; see also Shah v. Shah, Civil No. 12-4648
(RBK/KMW), 2013 WL 12157867, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2013) (evaluating the split
authorities, including Liu, on the issue of mitigation before holding that the
plaintiff’s failure to mitigate remained a question of fact in the case).
85
Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
86
Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d 808, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
87
In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 871–72 (Ct. App. 2017).
88
Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016). The case involved a
divorced immigrant spouse who moved in with her son after a divorce. Id. The court
drew on Liu to hold that the son’s support of the ex-spouse would not offset the
sponsor’s obligations of support, maintaining that “the sponsor is not an intended
beneficiary of the affidavit-of-support requirement.” Id. at 1179.
89
Id. (“Because the sponsor is not an intended beneficiary of the
affidavit-of-support requirement, we see no reason why the sponsor, rather than the
immigrant, should receive the windfall. To the contrary, allowing the sponsor to
receive the windfall would undermine the purpose of the affidavit of support, which
is to prevent the admission to the United States of any alien who is likely at any
time to become a public charge. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, that purpose
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the Northern District of California mirrored the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning when denying a defense of fraud in the
inducement, another potential common-law defense to the
Affidavit.90
In Shah v. Shah, however, the District Court of New Jersey
denied a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment where it found
that there were triable issues of fact pertinent to plaintiff’s
alleged failure to mitigate her damages.91 The court observed
that “[c]ourts are divided” on the issue of mitigation,92 and did
not adopt a definitive stance on the issue.93 The court also
entertained, but subsequently dismissed, the defendant’s
arguments asserting fraud and unconscionability, seemingly
assuming that these common-law contract defenses could be
applied to the Affidavit.94 Still, though, Liu remains the leading
case on the issue, and courts, including the court in Shah, have
not challenged its reasoning directly.95 The remainder of this
Note, then, will focus primarily on why the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Liu should not be exclusively relied upon in
interpreting the Affidavit.

is best served by interpreting the affidavit in a way that makes prospective sponsors
more cautious about sponsoring immigrants.” (internal citations and quotations
omitted)).
90
Dorsaneo v. Dorsaneo, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[IIRIRA]
and implementing regulations show that the purpose of the support obligation is to
ensure that family-sponsored immigrants do not become a ‘public charge.’ ”). While
the court did not cite directly to Liu to support this statement, it drew on similar
portions of the legislative record and similarly did not explore PRWORA’s role in the
statutory scheme. Id. It should also be observed that the Dorsaneo trial took place
within the Ninth Circuit after Erler, the Ninth Circuit case that had previously
drawn on Liu to discern the statutory purpose behind the Affidavit. See Erler, 824
F.3d at 1179.
91
See Shah v. Shah, Civil No. 12-4648 (RBK/KMW), 2013 WL 12157867, at *5
(D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2013).
92
Shah, 2013 WL 12157867, at *5.
93
Shah, decided in 2013, was written where the bulk of authority still assumed
that common-law defenses could apply to the Affidavit. See infra Part III.A.
94
Id. at *3–*4.
95
See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586; Shah, 2013 WL 12157867, at *5; see also
Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2017); Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d
808, 819 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 871
(Ct. App. 2017).
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III. BREAKING DOWN THE ARGUMENTS: A HARD LOOK AT THE
ARGUMENTS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
UNDERLYING LIU V. MUND
In addressing the question of whether courts should apply a
mitigation defense, the arguments from the case law and, more
particularly, Liu v. Mund, may aptly be organized into a set of
sub-issues: (1) whether common law contract principles are
consistent with the statutory design of the Affidavit of Support;
(2) whether the purpose of the affidavit requirement precludes
the application of a mitigation duty—and, by implication, other
common law contract defenses; (3) whether a mitigation inquiry
may be justified in light of concerns about judicial efficiency; and
(4) whether equitable considerations favor either a sponsor or
immigrant assuming primary responsibility to prevent the
immigrant from becoming a public charge.96 Another issue, not
discussed in any depth in the case law, is possibly monumental: if
the Government or benefit-issuing agencies attempt to enforce
their rights under the Affidavit—as the Trump Administration
has expressed a desire to do97—how should this weigh in courts’
interpretation of the obligations and nature of the Affidavit?
This Part will address each of these sub-issues in turn.
A.

Common Law Contract Principles Should Be Applied to the
Affidavit of Support Because Their Application is Consistent
with PRWORA and IIRIRA, Principles of Statutory
Construction, and Case Law Preceding Liu

The pertinent statutory provisions set forth under PRWORA
and IIRIRA, together with commonly applied principles of
statutory construction, hedge in favor of the application of
common law defenses to the I-864. As an interpretive canon,
courts presume that common-law rules will apply where
Congress has used a word with a well-settled common law
tradition and has not expressly defined it to mean otherwise.98
96
See supra Part II(B). This analytical framework is derived primarily from the
Liu opinion, as well as an amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of plaintiff Wenfang Liu
by attorney Frank Dickerson. See generally Reply Brief of Amicus Curiae to Assist
the Court, Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1453).
97
See generally May 23 Memo, supra note 2.
98
See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEO. L.J. 341, 396–98 (2010); see also, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1,
7–10 (2014) (drawing heavily from Black’s Law Dictionary and other common-law
principles to distinguish between the meaning of a “statute of limitations” and a
“statute of repose”). This canon is codified in several state statutes. Id. at 423–24; see
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As Judge Posner acknowledges in Liu, “[t]he duty to mitigate is a
conventional part of the common law of contracts and can be
enforced against a third-party beneficiary.”99 Where the statute
expressly provides for a “contract,” a concept with a well-settled
common law tradition, this canon, combined with the statutory
text, could dictate that a court should presume that Congress
intended the Affidavit to contain the ancillary doctrines that flow
from the common-law law of contracts, including mitigation
of damages.100
In the Liu opinion, however, the Seventh Circuit takes care
to distance itself from common law canons when contemplating
the issue of mitigation of damages.101 After describing his view of
the history of common law,102 Circuit Judge Posner set aside
common law principles and reframed the issue as one primarily
pertaining to “statutory and regulatory objectives.”103 To support
this approach, Judge Posner engaged in some sleight of hand: he
cited to Prudential Ins. Co. v. Athmer, a decision he penned in
1999 that has similarly dismissive language about the common
law.104 Even in that case, however, Judge Posner acknowledged
that an abundance of case law supported the principle that
“when a question relating to the interpretation and
administration of . . . [a government contract] arises that is not
answered by the statute itself . . . the answer is to be supplied by
federal common law.”105

also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 2-4-203(d) (West
2019); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-401(A) (West 2019).
99
Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th
Cir. 2012).
100
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981)
(articulating the common-law mitigation doctrine). This approach was not necessary
with the third-party beneficiary doctrine, however: The statute expressly provides
that the immigrant shall be a third party to the Affidavit of Support. Liu, 686 F.3d
at 420–21.
101
Liu, 686 F.3d at 421.
102
Id. (“[J]udges had made up the common law, which for an age was virtually
the entire law of England, and they resented legislative interlopers. One would
hardly expect legislators to respond by being careful not to step into the common law
flower bed.”) (citations omitted).
103
Id.
104
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 1999)
(“Since the concept of ‘federal common law’ is nebulous when a statute is in the
picture, it might be better to jettison the concept in that context and say simply that
in filling gaps left by Congress in a federal program the courts seek to effectuate
federal policies.”).
105
Id.
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Further, it is important to note that Judge Posner addressed
a common-law canon that is distinct from the one described
above.106 In Liu, Judge Posner addressed the presumption that
“statutory repeals of common law rules are disfavored,” which he
ultimately rebuked as a “hoary maxim.”107
This canon,108
however, is distinct from the aforementioned presumption that
Congress, when employing words with common-law traditions,
does so with the understanding that their common-law meaning
is intended.109 While Judge Posner correctly stipulated that the
former canon is outdated and out of fashion,110 he did not address
the latter canon, which would also be pertinent to the
interpretation of the statutory requirement.111 Generally, in both
Liu and Athmer, Judge Posner appeared eager to relegate federal
common law to a doctrine of last resort, or at least diminish its
importance in the statutory interpretation process, for ideological
reasons.112
This approach departs from the majority of previous cases to
deal with the specific issue of mitigation under the Affidavit. In
Stump v. Stump, the District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana addressed whether an immigrant had a duty to mitigate
her damages after a divorce from her husband, who was her
sponsor under the form.113 The court examined the plaintiff’s
efforts to secure employment both before and after the
termination of the marriage.114
Taking these facts into
consideration in its damages analysis, the court found that the
plaintiff had made “reasonable efforts to obtain employment and
106

See supra Part III.A.
Liu, 686 F.3d at 421.
108
A more precise articulation of this canon is that “statutes in derogation of the
common law must be strictly construed.” Scott, supra note 98, at 396.
109
See id.
110
See Liu, 686 F.3d at 421 (“But the hoary maxim that statutory repeals of
common law rules are disfavored is a poor guide to legislative meaning, for it is the
fossil remnant of the traditional hostility of English judges to legislation.”). In 2010,
shortly before Liu was decided, the canon that “statutory repeals of common law
rules are disfavored” had been expressly rejected in twenty states and codified in
none. See Scott, supra note 98, at 424.
111
Liu, 686 F.3d at 421.
112
Judge Posner was a steadfast critic of interpretative canons. See Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 800, 806 (1983) (“I . . . think that most of the canons [of statutory
construction] are just plain wrong.”).
113
Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *1, (N.D. Ind.
May 27, 2005).
114
Id. at *3.
107
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be self-sufficient” and denied the defendant a mitigation of
damages defense on that factual basis.115 Ultimately, the Stump
court did not expressly declare that a mitigation defense was
available under the I-864, but it suggested that the defense
should apply in a general sense for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff’s
“reasonable efforts,” and not principles of law, were the primary
grounds for denying the defense, and (2) “the duty to mitigate, or
avoid, damages is a basic tenant of contract law.”116 The Stump
court, then, assumed that common-law contract principles would
govern enforcement of the I-864.117
Cases from other jurisdictions generally took one of two
approaches to the issue of mitigation: (1) they imposed the duty
outright, or (2) they assumed that such a duty exists but held
that the facts did not warrant its imposition.118 Such courts
routinely considered a plaintiff’s “reasonable efforts” as a
component of a plaintiff’s duty to mitigate under the affidavit.119
Though Liu has been influential in deciding whether the
Affidavit of Support should be interpreted according to common
law contract principles, other courts have followed a different
course.120 Whatever the merits of this argument against using
common law principles, courts outside the Seventh Circuit need

115

Id. at *7.
Id.
117
Id. at *5–*7. In the Stump court’s construction, the form included an offer
and acceptance, and consideration for the support obligations was “ ‘the sponsored
immigrant not being found inadmissible to the United States under section
212(a)(4)(C).’ ” Id. at *6.
118
See Naik v. Naik, 944 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (“We
construe this language to mean that . . . the sponsored immigrant is expected to
engage in gainful employment, commensurate with his or her education, skills,
training and ability to work in accordance with the common law duty to mitigate
damages.”); see also Younis v. Farooqi, 597 F. Supp. 2d 552, 556 (D. Md. 2009)
(“Assuming the plaintiff has an obligation to mitigate her damages by seeking
employment, she need not apply for every available job in order to mitigate her
losses; she need only make reasonable efforts.”); Shumye v. Felleke, 555 F. Supp. 2d
1020, 1025–26 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (examining whether divorce settlement agreements,
student loans, student grants, and affordable housing subsidies should be considered
income to offset the defendant’s financial obligations under the I-864).
119
See Younis, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 556; Naik, 944 A.2d at 717.
120
Supra note 118 and accompanying text. As of the time of writing, Erler v.
Erler, decided by the Ninth Circuit, represents the only other instance where a
Federal Circuit Court has analyzed the I-864 in depth. 824 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2016).
116
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not tether themselves to the Seventh Circuit’s particular
approach from Liu and Athmer when deciding whether to apply
those principles to the Affidavit.121
B. The Seventh Circuit, in Liu, Misconstrued the Statutory
Purpose of the Affidavit Because Concerns About Immigrants’
Self-Sufficiency Are Central to the Requirement
It follows logically that, if the Seventh Circuit sought to
relegate common law principles to a doctrine-of-last-resort role, it
would need to find that the statutory purpose was sufficiently
clear to preclude their use. Where the defendant in Liu argued
that the purpose is a “general principle of self-sufficiency,”122 the
Seventh Circuit found that the purpose of the Affidavit is a
distinct one: “to prevent the admission to the United States of
any alien who ‘is likely at any time to become a public
charge.’ ”123 It would be a mistake, however, to rely uncritically
upon this distinction without further exploring the concept of
self-sufficiency.124
As discussed earlier, the Seventh Circuit’s claim that
“self-sufficiency . . . is not the goal stated in the statute” is
misleading.125
When discussing the statutory history, the
Seventh Circuit fails to mention that the Affidavit’s
enforceability requirement comes not from IIRIRA, an
immigration-based statute, but from PRWORA, a welfare reform
statute highly preoccupied with immigrants’ self-sufficiency and

121
A logical alternative would be to use an approach similar to the approaches
used in Stump, Naik, and Shah.
122
Brief of Amicus Curae United States of America Not in Support of a
Particular Party or Outcome at 13, Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No.
11-1453). The government further draws directly from the text of PRWORA:
“Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since
this country’s earliest immigration statutes.” 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (2006).
123
Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir.
2012).
124
See, e.g., Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1133 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (“[W]hile
an immigrant's self-sufficiency may be a compelling goal, it is not the purpose of the
I–864 Affidavit, which is to ensure the immigrant does not become a ‘public
charge.’ ” (quoting Liu, 686 F.3d at 422)); Zhu v. Deng, 794 S.E.2d 808, 819 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2016); Villars v. Villars, 305 P.3d 321, 325 (Alaska 2013) (“The purpose
of § 1183a is to provide a minimum level of support so that the sponsored immigrant
does not become a public charge.” (citing Liu, 686 F.3d at 422–23)).
125
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422; see also supra Part II.B.
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the receipt of public benefits.126 For this reason, the concept of
self-sufficiency should not be dismissed offhand, but analyzed,
particularly in relation to the public charge doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit argues that “it is not for [the sponsor’s]
benefit that the duty of support was imposed; it was imposed for
the benefit of federal and state taxpayers and of the donors to
organizations that provide charity for the poor.”127 In the court’s
view, the primary beneficiaries of the Affidavit, and, vis-à-vis, the
public charge doctrine, are the taxpayers and donors who would
not need to support an immigrant who is a draw on public
resources.128 In this interpretation, it would stand to reason that
(1) an obligation without excusing conditions and (2) deterrence
are primary objectives of the Affidavit.129 If the obligations of the
Affidavit are clear and restrictive, the reasoning goes, taxpayers
would assume less risk that the immigrant will draw on public
resources for support if (1) sponsors have a difficult-to-escape
payment obligation and (2) sponsors have an incentive to refuse
to support a financially risky immigrant.
It is less clear, however, how the Seventh Circuit might
interpret the goal of self-sufficiency and whom the beneficiaries
of such a goal might be.130 There are several ways to interpret
self-sufficiency in the context of the Affidavit.
A narrow
interpretation would be that self-sufficiency refers merely to an
immigrant’s freedom from financial dependence on the state.131 A
second interpretation would refer to an immigrant’s
self-sufficiency as independent not only from the state, but also
from others, perhaps including the sponsor.132 This second
reading would not only construct self-sufficiency as an economic
principle, but also link it with a broad moral principle of
self-reliance.133
126

See supra Part II.B.
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422.
128
See id.
129
See id.
130
See id. Though not expressly included in the Affidavit of Support
requirement, immigrants’ “self-sufficiency” was a preeminent policy consideration
underlying IIRIRA. 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
131
To some extent, this interpretation would harmonize with the 104th
Congress’ policy statements concerning welfare and immigration. See
8 U.S.C. § 1601.
132
This interpretation is supported by the IIRIRA legislative record as well as
one of the terminating conditions in the Affidavit, discussed infra Part III.B.
133
This approach is consistent with PRWORA, as well as the government
amicus curiae’s position in Liu v. Mund. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of
127

2019]

CONTRACT RIGHTS UNDER THE I-864

529

If self-sufficiency is narrowly understood as an immigrant’s
freedom from financial dependence on the state, then it is merely
a mirror of the public charge concept.134 It could only be
distinguished in terms of perspective: the primary objective of
self-sufficiency would, in this case, be an immigrant’s freedom
from dependence on public resources.135 In that scenario, a
self-sufficient person could be reduced to the opposite of a public
charge. Followed logically, this definition would render the
Seventh Circuit’s distinction a non-sequitur.136 In Liu, the
Seventh Circuit sidestepped the issue and dismissed the
self-sufficiency principle in its entirety, despite its centrality in
the statutory scheme.137 In doing so, it entirely cast aside
PRWORA—the statute that authorized the Affidavit’s
enforceability requirement—and interpreted the Affidavit as
being concerned primarily with economic burden-shifting and the
protection of taxpayer interests.138
The legislative history, structure of the Affidavit, and other
factors further suggest that the purposes of the Affidavit extend
beyond those set forth in Liu. Most obviously, the full titles for
America Not in Support of a Particular Party or Outcome at 13, Liu v. Mund, 686
F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1453) (“[T]he general principle of self-sufficiency
underlying the immigration system counsels in favor of a duty to mitigate.”)
(emphasis added).
134
See id.
135
This would comport with the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s
definition of “public charge:” “an alien who has become (for deportation purposes) or
who is likely to become (for admission/adjustment purposes) ‘primarily on the
government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either (i) the receipt of public cash
assistance for income maintenance or (ii) institutionalization for long-term care at
government expense.’ ” Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on
Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28689 (proposed May 26, 1999). It would also
harmonize with the stated policy goal that “[i]t continues to be the immigration
policy of the United States that aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on
public resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities and
the resources of their families, their sponsors, and private organizations.”
8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A).
136
Substituting the term “public charge” for “person who is not self-sufficient:”
“But self-sufficiency . . . is not the goal stated in the statute; the stated statutory
goal, remember, is to prevent the admission to the United States of any alien who ‘is
likely at any time to become a person who is not self-sufficient.’ ” Liu v. Mund, 686
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012). A doctrine that
would exclude not-self-sufficient people would hardly contravene a principle of selfsufficiency.
137
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1) (stating PRWORA’s first
statement of policy with respect to immigration and welfare is that “[s]elf-sufficiency
has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since the country’s
earliest immigration statutes”).
138
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422.
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each piece of legislation pertinent to the Affidavit—(1) the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act, and (2) the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act—suggest that self-sufficiency was at the
forefront of Congress’ considerations when it made the Affidavit
an enforceable contract. Even more tellingly, PRWORA, the
statute that made the Affidavit an enforceable contract, does not
mention public charge determinations outside of the specific
provision rendering the Affidavit enforceable.139 These factors
suggest that the self-sufficiency of previously admitted
immigrants, and not the admissibility of incoming immigrants,
was the foremost concern of the Affidavit requirement.
Furthermore, within the PRWORA scheme, the Affidavit’s
enforceability requirement is placed among restrictions on
immigrants’ access to public benefits. No other provisions in that
section pertain to an immigrant’s inadmissibility to the United
States under the public charge doctrine.140
More broadly,
PRWORA’s central provisions deal primarily with broad-based
reforms to public benefits programs;141 concerns about
immigrants’ admissibility are, at best, an afterthought in the
overall scheme and purpose of PRWORA.142
Even independently of an analysis of PRWORA, there is
ample evidence in IIRIRA that the purposes for the Affidavit
extend beyond deterrence. House Reports for IIRIRA discuss the
Affidavit squarely in the context of encouraging an immigrant’s
self-reliance, declaring “[t]he provision is designed to encourage
immigrants to be self-reliant in accordance with national
immigration policy.”143
Here and elsewhere in the report,
Congress seems concerned with the behavior of the immigrant,
and not the sponsor, with respect to the question of who shall
bear responsibility to prevent the immigrant from becoming a
public charge.144
This concern suggests that the purpose
139

See PRWORA, supra note 31, sec. 423.
See id. sec. 400.
141
Such reforms include: (1) apportioning the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families on the basis of block grants, (2) restricting eligibility for the Supplemental
Security Income program, and (3) implementing various provisions related to
children’s welfare. See PRWORA, supra note 31, secs. 100, 200–04, 400.
142
But see id. sec. 400(6) (“It is a compelling government interest to remove the
incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”).
143
H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 241 (1996) (emphasis added). “Self-reliance” and
“self-sufficiency” are terms used interchangeably in the legislative record.
144
Id. at 127; see also id. at 238 (“The purpose of the congressional grants of
authority to States regarding eligibility for public benefits contained in this Act is to
140
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underlying the Affidavit is not only economic burden-shifting, but
also a moral principle that immigrants should seek to find work
and to become self-sufficient.145
This reading is also supported by the structure of the
Affidavit itself, particularly in its terminating condition that
releases the sponsor from the support obligations where the
immigrant accumulates a certain amount of work.146
If
protecting taxpayers and communities from dependent
immigrants is the sole purpose of the Affidavit requirement,
terminating the sponsor’s support obligation upon completion of
ten years of work would do nothing to effectuate that purpose.147
Further, of the five terminating conditions contained in the
Affidavit, the accumulation-of-work condition is the only
condition not directly linked to the immigrant’s immigration
status.148

encourage States to implement the national immigration policy of assuring that
aliens be self-reliant and not become public charges-a fundamental part of U.S.
immigration policy since 1882.” (emphasis added)). That second passage is also
persuasive; if “self-reliance” and “not becom[ing a] public charge[]” are synonymous,
then this statement would be repetitive. The congressional record suggests instead
that self-reliance is primarily a moral principle, while public charge is more
concerned with economic distribution and resources.
145
Id. at 241. This report suggests a reading that sponsors play a “safety net”
role instead of assuming primary and sole responsibility for the immigrant. See
McLawsen, supra note 15.
146
IIRIRA provides:
An affidavit of support is not enforceable after such time as the alien (i) has
worked 40 qualifying quarters of coverage as defined under title II of the
Social Security Act [42 U.S.C.A § 401 et seq.] or can be credited with such
qualifying quarters as provided under subparagraph (B) . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(3)(A) (2012).
147
If an immigrant has met the work requirement, the immigrant’s sponsor
would be released from the support obligation under the Affidavit. At this time,
there would be no binding guarantee that would preclude the immigrant from
becoming a public charge or that would allow the state to recoup benefits in that
instance. If the purpose of the affidavit were merely to protect taxpayers, this
terminating condition would contravene that purpose by precluding sponsor liability
where the immigrant becomes a public charge. While it could be argued that
meeting the condition demonstrates that the immigrant has a low risk of becoming a
public charge, it is more plausible to conclude that the work condition (a) provides
an incentive to the sponsor to encourage the sponsored immigrant to seek work, or
(b) communicates the government’s expectation that the immigrant will make
good-faith efforts to become self-reliant, or both.
148
The other four grounds for termination are (1) death, (2) naturalization,
(3) loss of lawful permanent resident status, or (4) replacement of the Affidavit. See
8 U.S.C. § 1183a.
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This condition, seemingly inconsistent with the other
components of the Affidavit, has parallel provisions in
PRWORA.149 These provisions deal with eligibility for certain
federal and state benefit programs.150 Tellingly, none of those
provisions deal with issues of public charge admissibility.
Instead, they pertain only to the receipt of public benefits after
an immigrant has already arrived.151
Both the legislative history and the structure of the Affidavit
suggest that the purpose of the Affidavit requirement is not just
to assign responsibility for the immigrant to the sponsor, but also
to encourage an immigrant to become personally self-sufficient
both morally and economically. At best, it can be said that
Congress’ purpose for the Affidavit is mixed. The Affidavit
serves the dual purposes of (1) protecting taxpayers from
immigrants becoming a strain on public resources and
(2) encouraging immigrants to seek employment with the goal of
becoming self-sufficient.152 These purposes lead to opposite
outcomes with respect to a mitigation requirement.153 The
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Liu, however, finds a singular
purpose for the Affidavit requirement where the authorizing
statutes are, at best, ambiguous. This outcome may be justified,
or at least explained, however, by the court’s ideological
disposition toward applying the common law154 and the court’s
preferences with respect to the other sub-issues presented in the
case.155

149
See PRWORA, supra note 31, secs. 402(a)(2)(B)(ii), 402(b)(2)(B)(ii),
412(b)(2)(B)(i) (tying eligibility for certain benefits into an attainment of “40
qualifying quarters of coverage”).
150
See id.
151
See id. secs. 402, 412.
152
See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text.
153
If the primary purpose is to shift a burden onto the sponsor, then a
mitigation of damages defense would contravene this purpose by releasing the
sponsor from at least a part of the support obligation. If the primary purpose is to
encourage self-reliant behavior by the immigrant, a mitigation of damages defense
would encourage that behavior by compelling the immigrant to secure resources
independently of the sponsor.
154
See supra Part III(A). If the court is reluctant to apply the common law, it
follows logically that the court might dig deeper to find a clear legislative purpose to
avoid its use, even if such a purpose is not evident from the text of the statute.
155
See supra Part III (identifying the subissues of judicial efficiency and
equitable concerns).
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C. The Seventh Circuit’s Concerns About Judicial Efficiency
Should Not Persuade Courts To Adopt That Court’s
Interpretation of the Affidavit of Support Requirement
In later decisions, the Seventh Circuit moved away from
statutory analysis and examined the issue of mitigation from a
cost-benefit perspective.156 Focusing on the “meager” support
obligation,157 Judge Posner concluded that the court could not
“see much benefit” in imposing a duty to mitigate on the
immigrant compared to the cost of imposing it in the present
case.158 Indeed, the plaintiff in Liu was entitled to just over ten
thousand dollars.159 If, then, the defendant’s mitigation defense
were properly pleaded and corroborated with factual evidence, it
would have set off only a few thousand dollars at most.160 In the
specific context of Liu, then, it is easy to see how the cost of
imposing the defense would outweigh the potential benefit.
While it may have made sense to dismiss a mitigation
defense in this specific factual context, the obligation should not
be dismissed broadly.161 The support obligation is (1) indefinite,
and thus can accrue considerably over time,162 and is (2) distinct
in a majority of states from other familial support obligations.163
In different factual scenarios,164 the benefits to imposing duty to
mitigate could certainly offset the costs from a standpoint of
judicial efficiency.165
In these circumstances, the support

156

See Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422–23 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418
(7th Cir. 2012).
157
Id. at 422. At the time of decision, the support obligation, tied to the National
Poverty Line, was roughly $13,500 per year for an individual. Id. at 419.
158
Id. at 422–23. When referring to “cost,” Judge Posner refers to the burden of
the factual investigation necessary to impose a mitigation of damages defense; here,
his language is dismissive, and resists “the increased complication of enforcing the
duty of support” and federal courts’ involvement in “domestic-relations disputes.” Id.
159
Liu v. Mund, 748 F. Supp. 2d, 958, 965 (W.D. Wis. 2010), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part, 686 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2012).
160
Id.
161
See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586.
162
Governments and benefits-issuing agencies may sue for benefits received in
the ten years preceding the action. See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(2)(C) (2012).
163
See McLawsen, supra note 3, at 589.
164
It would not be difficult to imagine a scenario where more damages were on
the line than a few thousand dollars. See infra Part III.E.
165
See Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422–23 (7th Cir.), as amended, 686 F.3d 418
(7th Cir. 2012).
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obligation would be “mighty” and not “meager;”166 courts should
retain distance from Liu to ensure more equitable outcomes
where the facts differ.167
D. While the Liu Result May Have Been a Fair Result for the
Case, A Broad Denial of a Mitigation of Damages Defense
Could Yield Unfair Results and Abuse
Many of the mitigation of damages cases under the I-864
involve two competing narratives: the immigrant alleges that the
sponsor is spitefully withholding payments to his ex-spouse,
while the sponsor alleges that the immigrant is free-riding.168
Indeed, Liu alleged that Mund was adulterous, as well as
physically and psychologically abusive toward her.169 While such
facts were in dispute, Judge Posner mentioned that the parties
“had an awful marriage,” and he insinuated that the defendant’s
actions may have been “motivated . . . by spite.”170 If the court
felt, as these facts and language suggest, that the plaintiff was
more sympathetic than the defendant in this case, it would make
sense from an equitable standpoint to deny Mund a mitigation
defense.
From a more general standpoint, however, the court
stumbled when it addressed the potential issue of free-riding.
The court acknowledged that “the duty of support acts as a heavy
tax on earned income” for an immigrant, where a low-earning
immigrant would have little incentive to seek work absent a duty
to mitigate damages.171 If one of the animating purposes of the
Affidavit is “to encourage immigrants to be self-reliant,” such an
166

McLawsen, supra note 3, at 586; Liu, 686 F.3d at 422.
See, e.g., Erler v. Erler, No. CV-12-2793-CRB, 2013 WL 6139721, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 2013) (“[C]ourts must strike a balance between ensuring that the
immigrant's income is sufficient to prevent her from becoming a public charge while
preventing unjust enrichment to the immigrant.”), vacated and remanded, 824 F.3d
1173 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit drew primarily from Liu’s understanding of
the Affidavit in deciding whether a sponsor owed support to his divorced immigrant
spouse where she had been living with, and was supported by, her adult son. Erler,
824 F.3d at 1179.
168
See, e.g., Li Liu v. Kell, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1132–33 (W.D. Wash. 2017);
Shah v. Shah, Civil No. 12-4648 (RBK/KMW), 2013 WL 12157867, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct.
28, 2013); In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2017).
169
Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant, Wenfang Liu, Liu, 686 F.3d 418
(No. 11-1453), 2012 WL 481399, at *7.
170
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422–23.
171
Id. at 422 (noting that if Liu were to secure a job and earn $15,000 per year,
she would be working for a net gain of only $1,500 when compared to the $13,500
worth of support she would otherwise be entitled to under the Affidavit).
167
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incentive against seeking work would directly contravene that
purpose.172 In Liu, Judge Posner sidesteps this potential issue,
making favorable assumptions about the plaintiff to minimize
concerns about free-riding in the context of her case.173 Absent
these particular facts—and, perhaps, absent similar willingness
to make bold assumptions about a person’s earning
potential—courts should distance themselves from Liu, following
other courts to take a more balanced approach to the incentives
created by the affidavit.174
E. A Speculative Issue: Which Approach Courts Should Take If
or When Federal or State Governments Attempt to Enforce
Their Rights Under the Affidavit
While Liu and most cases discussed above have involved an
immigrant enforcing her rights under the Affidavit, courts should
not dismiss the possibility that the Federal Government, state
governments, or other agencies could attempt to do the same.175
Currently, fear of political backlash is considered a primary
deterrent preventing governments and agencies from attempting
to recoup benefits from immigrants’ sponsors.176 If, however,
political factors pressured agencies to enforce the Affidavits,177 it
is possible that agencies and governments would do so on a
massive scale.178 Indeed, a memorandum issued by the Trump
172

See supra Part III.B (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 241 (1996)).
Liu, 686 F.3d at 422 (“But [Liu] might be able to get, or work her way up to,
a much better job than one that pays $15,000, which is barely minimum wage.
College educated, she may just need to improve her spoken English to get a good job.
Most Chinese immigrants nowadays do very well in the United States.”).
174
See, e.g., Erler v. Erler, No. CV-12-2793-CRB, 2013 WL 6139721, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 2013) (“[C]ourts must strike a balance between ensuring that the
immigrant’s income is sufficient to prevent her from becoming a public charge while
preventing unjust enrichment to the immigrant.”), vacated and remanded, 824 F.3d
1173 (9th Cir. 2016); Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *9,
(N.D. Ind. May 27, 2005).
175
8 U.S.C. 1183a(e)(2) (2012).
176
Guevara & Calope, supra note 28, at 2852.
177
The Trump Administration’s new public charge guidelines, which define and
expand the benefits which fall under the “public charge” designation, are likely to
increase sponsors’ liability where they sponsor immigrants who are receiving public
benefits. See Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41320 (Aug.
12, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, & 248). This change
will, at the very least, increase state agencies’ purely economic incentives to enforce
their rights under the Affidavit.
178
In one dramatic instance, the Connecticut Department of Social Services
sued roughly 300 sponsors under the Affidavit for benefits received by immigrants
under Medicaid and the State-Administered General Assistance Program. Ann
173
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Administration on May 23, 2019, attempts to do exactly that:
within ninety days of publication of the memorandum, various
agencies must issue guidance and procedures on how to seek
reimbursement from sponsors under the Affidavit.179 Taken
together with the purpose statements in the memorandum, it is
clear that the Trump Administration intends to put pressure on
agencies to utilize these newly minted procedures and to enforce
the Affidavits.180 If such enforcement efforts were to take place,
it is unclear what defenses immigrants and their sponsors would
have, especially given the scarcity of case law.181
When contemplating actions for enforcement of the Affidavit,
it is imperative that courts understand how recent changes to the
public charge doctrine have altered parties’ rights. A final rule
published on the Federal Register on August 14, 2019, makes
fundamental changes to the public charge doctrine and to the
Affidavit’s role in the determination process.182 First, it expands
the scope of benefits that are to be included in public charge
determination, divided into two principal categories of
“monetizable” and “non-monetizable” benefits.183 Courts should
be attentive to the benefit scheme in the new benefit guidelines;
one commentator noted that the standards may be “utterly
Byzantine to the layperson,” and therefore, also to the signatories
of the Affidavit.184
Marie Somma, State Suing Immigrants’ Sponsors, THE HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 1,
2007), http://articles.courant.com/2007-03-01/news/0703010724_1_legal-immigrantsimmigration-advocates-sponsors. The state’s then-Attorney General and future
Democratic Senator, Richard Blumenthal, shut down the effort. Id.
179
See May 23 Memo, supra note 2.
180
See id. (“A key priority of my Administration is restoring the rule of law by
ensuring that existing immigration laws are enforced. The immigration laws
currently require that, when an alien receives certain forms of means-tested public
benefits, the government or non-government entity providing the public benefit must
request reimbursement from the alien’s financial sponsor.” (emphasis added)). It
should be observed that requests for reimbursement only become mandatory “[u]pon
notification that a sponsored alien has received any means-tested public benefit.”
8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(1)(A). This characterization of the law is consistent with the
Trump Administration’s stated intent to place pressure on agencies to enforce
the Affidavits.
181
Tang, supra note 18, at 36. Megan McLeod, an attorney with Connecticut
Legal Services in Stamford, Connecticut, expanded on some policy implications of
enforcement: “You sponsor an immigrant . . . and that person develops a need for a
lung transplant. It’s completely impossible and grossly unfair for a sponsor to be
charged with paying that back.” Somma, supra note 178 (alteration in original).
182
Inadmissiblity on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41320, 41439.
183
Id. at 41295, 41297.
184
McLawsen, supra note 15.
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A second major change is a reworking of the
totality-of-the-circumstances test and an express statement that
“plac[ing] an emphasis on the affidavit of support in the public
charge determination” is contrary to the design of the
determinations.185 While this is consistent with the statutory
scheme, it departs from current procedures, where a sufficiently
executed Affidavit is “virtually always” sufficient to preclude a
public charge determination.186 Third, the rules will permit an
applicant who is inadmissible on public charge grounds to post a
$10,000 bond that will remain in effect until one of five
conditions is met and that may be forfeited when the sponsored
immigrant receives public benefits.187 While these rules are
subject to change, they may call into question some of the legal
reasoning underlying Liu.188
For example, imagine a hypothetical scenario where an
immigrant, enrolled in non-emergency Medicaid,189 receives an
annual average of $20,000 of benefits for a period of ten years.190
Theoretically, the sponsor would be liable to the state’s Medicaid
agency for the $200,000 received in public benefits, as he failed to
provide the support necessary to keep the immigrant from
becoming a public charge.191 If the distributing agency were to
bring charges, then, what defenses might the sponsor have to
this action?
If Liu’s reasoning holds firm, such harsh
consequences for the sponsor would further the purpose of the
Affidavit by recouping benefits for the intended beneficiaries to
the Affidavit—taxpayers—and possibly deterring sponsors from
185

Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41439. The
reverse, however, is not true: any immigrant who fails to submit a facially sufficient
Affidavit will be deemed inadmissible as likely to become a public charge.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(2).
186
McLawsen, supra note 15; see also 84 Fed. Reg. at 41439.
187
See McLawsen, supra note 15.
188
See supra Part II.B.
189
See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51114, 51159–60
(proposed Oct. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, &
248). The Trump Administration’s recent proposal permits non-emergency Medicaid
to be considered under consideration for public charge purposes, and estimates an
average annual benefit per beneficiary to be $7,426.59. Id.
190
See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(b)(2)(C) (2012) (providing that governments or other
benefit-issuing agencies may not pray for benefits that were issued more than ten
years before the onset of the action). This hypothetical scenario, then, imagines a
prayer amount of 270% of the estimated annual average of benefits received,
multiplied by the maximum number of years under which the government may seek
benefits under the statute.
191
See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(2).
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supporting immigrants in the first place.192 However, if courts
depart from Liu’s reasoning and permit common law defenses,193
any of the following might be available to sponsors: lack of
consideration,194 void for vagueness or lack of clear terms,195 and
unconscionability,196 among others.197 Departing from Liu and
remaining open to common law defenses, then, could grant courts
the necessary flexibility to prevent harsh outcomes for sponsors
and immigrants alike.

192

See supra Part II.B.
See Pratt & Kurzban, supra note 19, at 46–47.
194
Stump addressed this issue by providing that the immigrant not being found
inadmissible was the consideration to the Affidavit. Stump v. Stump, No.
1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 1290658, at *6, (N.D. Ind. May 27, 2005). It is crucial to
note, however, that the Trump administration’s recent proposal would alter the role
of the Affidavit of Support in public charge determinations. See supra notes 185–186
and accompanying text. If this change were to take effect, it would be necessary to
revisit the Stump formulation because the consideration to the Affidavit would be
different in character. Instead of nearly guaranteeing a waiver of inadmissibility on
public charge grounds, the Affidavit’s role would be weakened to being just one
small factor in a totality-of-the-circumstances test. With this weakened
consideration for the sponsor, along with the government’s increased
consideration—expansion of the benefit scheme—the Affidavit would be more
susceptible to a lack-of-consideration defense than it currently is under Stump and
similar jurisprudence.
195
The Affidavit of Support, or Form I-864, currently does not specify or name
any of the benefits listed by the Federal Register notice. Rather, it alludes to “any
covered means-tested public benefit” without an explicit definition of the term or
reference to a Federal Register notice. I-864, supra note 7, at 7. As the scheme of
“covered . . . public benefit[s]” is in flux and may become “utterly Byzantine to the
layperson,” this could prove fertile ground for a void-for-vagueness defense by the
sponsor. See McLawsen, supra note 15.
196
It has been argued that the Affidavit of Support is akin to an unconscionable
“contract of adhesion.” See Al-Mansour v. Shraim, Civil No. CCB-10-1729, 2011 WL
345876, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2011). These arguments have been largely
unsuccessful, but have not yet been utilized in a scenario where the government, not
an immigrant, is attempting to enforce its rights. See id at *3.; see also Anderson v.
United States, No. C17-0891RSL, 2017 WL 6558255, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 22,
2017) (emphasizing that the Affidavit’s potential unfairness does not rise to the level
of unconscionability). Unconscionability, however, could be a potent argument in
certain scenarios, like where an unsophisticated sponsor takes on a vast support
obligation by filling an I-864 without proper counsel—a frequent occurrence.
197
Along with other contract defenses, attorneys’ conflicts of interest between a
sponsor’s and sponsored immigrant’s interests would be worthy of close analysis if
the public charge benefit scheme is expanded.
193
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CONCLUSION:
COURTS SHOULD NOT RELY SOLELY ON THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S
FLAWED REASONING IN LIU V. MUND WHEN ADDRESSING THE
AFFIDAVIT OF SUPPORT REQUIREMENT
Courts should not rely on Liu’s reasoning to preclude
common law contract defenses, including the duty to mitigate
damages, when adjudicating the Affidavit of Support. The
court’s reasoning was seemingly rooted in (1) the Seventh
Circuit’s ideological disposition toward the common law, (2) a
misleading analysis of the statutory history, and (3) the
particular factual circumstances of Liu. If followed to its logical
conclusion, the effects of Liu could be catastrophic for low-income
immigrants and sponsors, and they do little to achieve the goals
underlying the Affidavit requirement. Courts, simply put, should
not rely on Liu to preclude common-law defenses that are “basic
tenant[s] of contract law.”198 Therefore, on grounds of legal
reasoning, statutory interpretation, sound policy, and good
conscience, courts should not feel obligated to support the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Liu v. Mund.

198 Stump v. Stump, No. 1:04-CV-253-TS, 2005 WL 2757329, at *7, (N.D. Ind.
Oct. 25, 2005).

